

Globalisation and urban violence: the case of São Paulo

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Introduction

A brief history of São Paulo

Describing São Paulo in the late XVI century Morse (1970), tell us that the village had, at the time, no more than 120 houses perched on top of a hill, despite the fact that it had been settled for over one hundred years. The inventories of the possessions of residents reveals the scarcity of imported goods and the costs that they involved: “a chair, an embroidered pillow case or a hat with plumes were worth as much as a horse or a cow”. The level of simplicity or destitution was such that in 1620 the only proper bed in the village was temporarily requested for the use of a visiting judge, under much protestation from its owner. Founded in 1554 by Jesuit priests, as a settlement with a church and a school to educate the local Indians, São Paulo was to remain no more than a village until the XIX century. Its location, on a plane above steep hills, that demanded that one “climbed up by grabbing on the roots of trees”¹, the cold temperatures bordering on freezing, and the risks of attacks by aggressive Indians, all contributed to its lack of attraction to potential settlers.

If poverty and destitution were key features of São Paulo in the early stages, these did not discourage the residents. On the contrary, to some authors this was one of the driving forces behind the formation of the “bandeiras”, the expeditions that set out into the heart of the continent and that extended the frontiers of the then Portuguese colonial territory far beyond what the Tordesilles Treaty with Spain entitled, and that were a trade mark of São Paulo in the XVI and XVII centuries.

It could be that this early experience of exploring the country under very difficult conditions, and the rudimentary trade that ensued set a pattern for the city that was to develop. By 1820, at the eve of independence from Portugal, the city had roughly 20,000 residents. After Independence the city began to change at a very quick pace. A Law school was established in 1827 and attended by students from all provinces in Brazil, if culturally the city was becoming more cosmopolitan, in economic terms it remained poor.

Also if the poor economic activity combined with the difficult access to the sea, kept the city very isolated, it was the production of coffee in the countryside of the province of São Paulo and the railway to the port city of Santos (in the 1860’s) that broke the cycle of economic deprivation and isolation. Coffee was grown in Brazil first in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro in the early XIX century, then moved into São Paulo and by the middle of the century was firmly established as a cash crop in the province. Coffee trade was the source of wealth for São Paulo, coffee plantations and the restrictions on slavery encouraged farmers to import labour from Europe this combined with the incentives given to the immigration of Europeans by the Emperor Pedro II, resulted in significant growth of immigration to Brazil and to São Paulo in particular.

By the 1870’s São Paulo had an incipient industry led by the expertise of foreign labour: furniture, tools, textiles, building materials, started to be produced locally at this time. Foreign migration had an enormous impact on the development of the city: between 1882 and 1891² at least 263,196 foreigners, arrived in Santos mostly destined to settle in São Paulo³. The vast majority of immigrants (200,000) were Italians, followed by Portuguese and Spaniards but also over twenty thousand other nationals that included Germans,

¹ São Paulo is located 60 kilometres away from the coastline, and 700 meters above sea level. A chain of hills covered in sub tropical vegetation lays between the coast and São Paulo. The hills are extremely steep and in some parts this means more up to 45 degrees of declivity. To this day road building in this coastal area is a challenge.

² This is the formally recorded immigration but since the coastal area of the country is so large (over 8,000 km of coast) it should not surprise that in the 1830’s there were already German immigrants settling in what would become of the districts of São Paulo, the village of Santo Amaro, where they established large timber processing industries.

³ Between 1820 and 1920 the population of the city went from 20,000 to 576,000 residents and by 1928 it was estimated to have “passed a million” (James, 1933)

Austrians, Russians, French, Danish, Belgians, English, Swedish, Swiss and Irish arrived in the province in this period. This was followed by larger and more diversified waves of immigration: between 1908 and 1920 another 530,000 immigrants entered the province of São Paulo, most heading to the city of São Paulo, still mostly Europeans and a few Syrian and Lebanese, but after the First War numerous groups of Eastern Europeans and Japanese also arrived.

Most of them played key roles in the industrialization process that took place early in the XX century and that lay the foundations for the consolidation of São Paulo as a industrial centre in the second half of last century. In this respect São Paulo breaks away from the pattern of Latin American cities, the vast majority of which developed first as bureaucratic, commercial or cultural centres (Morse, 1970). The reasons for this initial industrialization are ascribed to external and internal factors: international wars and economic depression encouraged the substitution of imported goods for locally produced ones, also it became clear that if Brazil continued to base its economy in trading agriculture products for industrial ones its development would quickly come to a halt.

By the 1930's São Paulo was already described as "industrial-commercial metropolis" (James, 1933) and this position was to be consolidated after the Second World War with the automobile industry. The initial industrialization was led by the presence of multiple opportunities: a broad and complex system of roads including railways (built to export of the coffee production); the growth of a local market; the presence of trained labour and access to raw materials as well as of money to be invested (the profits from coffee). In 1937 General Motors opened its first assembly line in what would later become the metropolitan region of São Paulo, São Caetano do Sul, Ford had another assembly line and in 1951 opened a second one. When Volkswagen arrived in 1953 the decision to locate in São Paulo seems to have been the result of a combination of factors: some of its major partners in Brazil were from São Paulo, there were two other vehicle manufacturers in the region, the state had a major paved highway system, now easy access to the sea port of Santos and to Cubatão where oil refineries were being established. Finally at that time the only other location that could compete with São Paulo was the then capital of Brazil: Rio de Janeiro, but for some time census data was indicating that the growth of population in São Paulo was greater, indicating that more of a consumer market would be available in São Paulo. The automobile industry certainly encouraged a number of other industries to follow, in particular all those that produced components for vehicles. As result other industries, that produced lorries, buses, tractors and all sorts of motorized equipment for agriculture, also settled in the area.

In 1960 São Paulo had 3,781,446 residents. It was not a metropolis but a large city, in fact it was just surpassing Rio de Janeiro as the largest city in Brazil. São Paulo differed from other cities in Brazil by the large numbers of foreign immigrants and by the fact that it was an industrial and financial centre. By the 1950's the expansion of the industrial area also attracted migrants from the countryside, from other states in the Southeast, in the Northeast and South of Brazil. São Paulo was consolidating its position as cosmopolitan and multicultural. In different areas of the city different languages could be heard, different foods could be tasted. There were bilingual schools for the children of immigrants that wanted to maintain their language alive and there was little or no discernible tension between the diverse groups and local citizens.

Globalisation and urban violence: a literature review

Globalisation and the urban space

Starting a literature review with the key words globalisation and urban violence gives a bias to the search: the literature that will be found will focus more on the disadvantages of globalisation than in the advantages. The expression globalisation, even before the World Social Forum emerged, was already loaded, with defenders or the "globalists" (Coleman, 2002) associating it with the development a global culture, the decline of the nation state, the elimination of borders and thus greater freedom of movement of peoples and goods, reduction of inequality, increased flow of information, strengthened democracy with the protection of human rights, preservation of the environment, and overall improvement of economic and social welfare ((Rotman, 2000).

Most critics of globalisation would constitute what Coleman (2002)⁴ call the “skeptics”: they tend to see nothing very new in globalisation, ascribing to Wallerstein’s position (in Smith, 2001) that there is “continuity in the global economy in the past 500 years” a view that some push even further back to the history of trade between the nations. Still even critics agree that today this phenomena has become far more complex: the flow of information, of monetary exchanges, products and peoples are unique results of present technological developments. The speed of the processes and the breadth are unparalleled in human history.

Critics of globalisation tend to attribute to this process a series of negative impacts on cities and on local economies. They also recognize that such impacts are complex, multifaceted and that differ from country to country. For some this will enhance inequalities (Garza, 1999)⁵ as central governments will withdraw from local planning. But just the opposite was found by Leaf (2002), who compared the effects of globalisation in urban planning in cities one in China and the other in Vietnam and who concluded that, globalisation was removing decision making power from local level and makes people’s daily lives dependent on events that are outside their sphere of control and that the culture friction caused by the intervention from the regional government, overriding traditional practices of the local government, was a major cause of concern because of the long term impact of such practices on local cultures.

Jenkins and Wilkinson (2002), analysed the impact of global economy on the urban development of Maputo and Capetown and in their assessment, globalisation had a positive impact on local government, as it demanded initiative from local government, they had to be prepared to be “more entrepreneurial in terms of urban development”⁶, thus globalisation impacts forms of local governance and the actual development of the urban area. This can have many positive aspects for in order to attract international investors, local government have to provide up-to date infrastructure, telecommunications, reliable supply of power and water, amongst others, generating benefits for other groups in society as well. Still an unwanted side effect is that, in poorer countries, attempting to provide this kind of infrastructure, while ensuring that the labour market and the real state markets “function effectively“, may result in the authors’ view in the “disruption of established local economies and increasing levels of socio economic polarization within local populations” which, in turn, may result in more exclusion of sectors of the population and or the growth of the informal economy. In the case of Cape Town this growth is not negligible, as in 1996 about 18% of the local labour force was in the informal sector.

Globalisation and criminal violence

The relations between globalisation and criminal violence is either a neglected topic in the literature, or the traditional search instruments failed to identify research on this topic, given that only two papers were found. Both authors, Weiss (2000) and Rotman (2000), being critical of what they consider to be negative impacts of globalisation has on violence. In their view, violence is an unwanted indirect result of the upheaval that globalisation produces in domestic economies and a direct result of the easy access to illegal commodities or to legal commodities that will be used to break the law.

This would be a consequence of specific type of globalisation that Weiss claims to be expanding- “laissez-faire globalisation” - defined as the deregulation of markets, labour, trade and finances that leads to a division of nations into loser or winners. To Weiss, despite the multiple gains from globalisation such as, some reduction in world poverty, some increase in Gross Domestic Product worldwide, growth in life expectancy, a reduction in child mortality, increase in adult literacy as well as in democracy, human rights,

⁴ Coleman (2002) in this paper produces an interesting critique of the World Bank in terms of the author identifies as an obliviousness of the Bank’s analysts when attributing sole responsibility for failures to implement economic reforms on local governments, as this results in money becoming without a territory while political issues are given a specific territory: blame is attributed to internal processes of decision making “as the site of inefficient governance, fiscal mismanagement and socio-macroeconomic irresponsibility”. Meanwhile little or no attention “Little attention is directed towards potential external determinants of macroeconomic instability.”

⁵ Garza (1999) analyzed the impact of economic globalization and in particular the adoption of neo-liberal model and the virtual abandonment of urban and regional planning in Mexico and makes a very pessimistic prediction: “Urban laissez faire combined with economic globalization will intensify the concentration of population and of economic activity in two or three polycentric regions under the dominance of the Mexico City megalopolis. The Federal Government is abdicating its planning functions with respect to the system of the cities. At the same time, it is delegating the internal organization of the cities to their local, most of which are poorly prepared and lack vision to carry out their functions reasonably well. This will lead to sharper regional inequalities.”

⁶ A view shared with McNeill (1999) in his analysis of the impact of globalization on European cities.

and more information circulation, its costs are too high. Disease, hunger and poverty in countries marginal to the “global marketplace”, greater polarization of wealth between countries and within countries, more youth unemployment, inadequate health care, and more poverty are some such costs.

The deregulation of labour markets, the need to downsize to increase competitiveness, contracting out, reducing taxes and social spending are, in Weiss’s view generating social stress, intensifying social fragmentation, and increasing personal insecurity. Governments are losing the capacity to intervene locally: “ *Even if political leaders wished to do more to mitigate the extremes of globalisation, they would be restricted because to breakaway with the mainstream results in the threat of economic isolation and this could result in crisis. For instance, should the government intervention be perceived by multinational corporations as make labour less “flexible” or as to increase taxes and duties*”, the country becomes less attractive to investors, a crisis of confidence in the local economies develops and as result an economic crisis is either precipitated or, if already in course, made more difficult.

In Weiss’s view this type of globalisation, in which the basic assumption is that “small government is better”, when applied to the criminal justice system produces more harm than good for in this aspect the opposite is true the more government the better. To Weiss globalisation reduces the criminal justice system to handling the losers from this process: the people who enter the shadow economy (legal or illegal) the people who migrate, the ones who engage in insurrection or rebellion, or yet in illegal activities. Globalisation, in his view (and in Parras’ perspective, apud Weiss, 2000) is an “inherently destabilizing and criminogenic force...(it) creates multiple opportunities and illegal motivations while weakening (social) controls.”

A similar view is sponsored by Rotman (2000), the two authors differ in that Rotman places emphasis in the fact that globalisation reaches all aspects of life: cultural, legal, political, public health, sciences besides the economic one. Though also stressing many positive aspects of globalisation, in particular to the progresses in access to civil, political and cultural rights, Rotman acknowledges that violence is one unintended outcome of globalisation. This author reminds us that “economically driven transnational violence” is not new trend but the revival of old mechanisms of gaining markets or products such as the Opium Wars, and the Conquest of the New World, we could no doubt add the slave trade to this list.

What about globalisation and criminal violence, in particular homicide?

Globalisation, often leads to economic restructuring or is narrowly associated to it. This tends to result in the loss less skilled or unskilled jobs, contrary to the predictions that globalisation would lead to better use of local labour (the comparative advantages). As result “large numbers of uneducated young males with few job opportunities...will be attracted to crime as an economic option crime becomes a better job opportunity ...requires no skills or specialized resources” (Rotman, 2000). It is not just that the labour market is reduced, but in countries, where the rights and safeguards are poorly enforced, globalisation could actually foster the exploitation of the less skilled workers. Globalisation would encourage crime nor only through the diminished labour market, that reduces legal opportunities for youth, but also by disseminating patterns of consumption, and of affluence. At the same time globalisation by increasing the speed and flexibility of communications, of transportation, allows the movement of financial capital and creates attractive conditions for the expansion of criminal activities across borders. In Rotman’s view globalisation fosters crime by excluding “segments of economies and societies from the networks of information available to the dominant society-providing foot soldiers for global crime enterprises.” Thus contexts in which “unemployment, alienation, youth abandonment” thrive are “ideal terrain for criminal recruitment of global drug dealers”.

The difference between past criminal activities and present ones, lays in the volume of resources involved and in the capacity that this type of crime has to corrupt, and to even disrupt, the political order. This type of criminal activity gains power through intimidation and fear, as well as by corruption, and in this role exercises what Rotman calls: “non-state sponsored authoritarianism”. At the limit, this type of criminal organization can undermine democracy, not just by intimidating and corrupting, but governments, in order to fight this form of crime, may resort to the suspension of rights or adopt measures that de facto threaten civil liberties.

In the context of São Paulo what potential role can globalisation play in terms of urban violence? Has Globalisation enhanced the conditions for violence or reduced them ?

To answer the question about the role that globalisation may played in the growth of urban violence in the case of São Paulo first we have define which violence and how globalisation is being defined. Globalisation has multiple features, some of which extremely positive, still in order to be able to explore whether there is any connection, between the continued growth of urban violence and globalisation ,we must specify what kind of violence and what feature of globalisation. We are adopting Vayrynen's approach to globalisation focussing on the economic perspective of globalisation as expressed in the process of liberalisation of economies that result in the expansion of the financial sector, of transportation, and communications, in the reduction bureaucracy that promote the emergence of global cities. Such cities are furthermore characterised by open and dynamic economies, prone to innovation with "dense social relations" (Vayrynen, 2003).

We will focus on interpersonal forms of urban violence, in particular on homicide as this type of violence provokes much fear and indignation and since its occurrence in a society signals that the civilisation process, the internalisation of the legal, moral and religious interdicts against the use of force against other human beings has not been fully achieved as one would expect in societies that are otherwise in step with technological, cultural, social and scientific levels of development. We will use data about homicide for this is the more reliable data on violence available. Police records tend to be unreliable everywhere because of underreporting⁷ by the public to the police.

We will focus specifically on the main variables used to explain the roots of violence, in particular among youth, since youth are the most vulnerable group both to become victims of violence and as aggressors, i.e. as agents of violence. In doing so we will examine in how far the role that globalisation, plays on such variables focussing on the case of São Paulo and Brazil when needed, as the liberalisation of the national economy was, to a large extent the result of policies designed by the federal government. Violence between ethnic groups or violence between gangs⁸ are not features of the violence that affects São Paulo. The occurrence of riots or major collective violence⁹ during labour strikes or as result of public demonstrations are also very rare, probably as legacy of the very strong hand played by the Military Regime.

Violence, has multiple causes is one of the basic consensus of this field youth as both victims and aggressors present same specificities in relation to the violence that affects other age groups (such as the elderly) or that has other profiles (violence against women). Urban violence and youth violence are not new phenomena but are a phenomena that acquired more visibility and became a source of concern in developed and developing countries since the second half of the last century. There has been a growth of youth violence and of involvement of youth in criminal activities in many continents in recent years. The numerous studies on the subject have shown that the risks that youth will be a victim or an aggressor are the result of combinations of individual, family, community, school, and social context, factors. This explains why risk is not homogeneous. Not all youth submitted to stressful homes, to economic deprivation, with a history of frustration and low self-esteem, with poor school record, or involved with a peer group that has a delinquent trajectory, will get into trouble.

Globalisation and the conditions of life

São Paulo grew maintaining large disparities. The profile that Brazil presents in the various reports on Human Development by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is one in which whatever the success the country has had in the economy this is not mirrored in the quality of life of its citizens. In

⁷ Underreporting may be the result of little credibility on the police, and or the result of shame, because police officers are unwilling to record the offence etc. The fact is that what is recorded does not necessarily represent the totality of events and worse, we have no means of identifying the error margin. That is the reason more developed countries routinely perform victimization surveys: to monitor the degree of underreporting and to have a more "real" picture of crime and violence in their society. In the absence of regularly conducted victimization surveys the statistics about homicide are considered to give a less distorted idea of the degree of violence in a society.

⁸ Youth gangs are uncommon in São Paulo and in most metropolitan regions of Brazil with the exception of the city of Manaus, in the state of Amazonas

⁹ Some violent conflicts have taken place in rural areas as result of land occupations by the landless peasants' movement, involving landlords, the police and peasants and others also in rural areas involving Indians and miners.

different indicators whether life expectancy, number of years of education, death by childbirth, child mortality, the country falls behind a number of poorer Latin American countries and has done so since the first report was issued. Part of this poor record is ascribed to the concentration of wealth, to the economic inequality and this seems to be a problem that cannot be solved. During the Military Regime the argument was that the inequality in the distribution of wealth was the result of the fact that the economy first had to grow and only then could the government implement income distributive policies. Responsibility for the concentration of income was deemed to be the result of the concentration of decision making, and regulation, in the hands of the Military, as well as in the protective measures, adopted to protect the local (domestic) industry, whether national or multinational resulting in that the local market had to submit to the prices set by this industry.

The liberalisation of the economy was a process that started a few years after the formal return to democracy (1985). It consisted of the lifting of trade barriers, reduction and even elimination of taxation on foreign products, lifting restrictions that prevented certain types of manufacturers from establishing in the country (such as more car manufacturers), changes on regulations on the movement of capital, lifting restrictions on transactions with foreign currency, and the privatisation of state enterprises: banks, telephone, electricity, roads, steel industries, mining and so forth. It was expected that this would result in higher rates of economic growth, in more investment of foreign capital, in an expansion of the infrastructure, the reduction of state deficit and in the overall Brazilian debit, and in improvement in productivity and in the capacity of the country to compete in the international market.

In the city of São Paulo it was expected that the city would continue to grow, as it had in the past, now with the constraints that the centralised economic policies, imposed by the Military Regime. It was also expected that some of the social deficit, accumulated during previous decades, would begin to be reduced. The risk of violence is associated to a number of such social deficits: the greater the inequality in income, the worse the housing conditions, the greater the housing instability (residential moves), the greater the economic stress on families, the greater the number of family breakdown, the greater the one parent family, the less educated the parents, the more violence is expected to take place within the family, the more risks there are for youth and children and the more violence it is expected to occur in the community as well.

The quality of schools determines, at least in part, the performance of youth and children. Accumulated research has shown that success in school protects children and youth from trouble (away from alcohol, drugs and delinquent behaviour) are greater. The diversity and quality of equipments in the community for them to pursue their interests (music, books, cinema, theatre, sports, contact with nature) determine how youth use their free time (time out of school). The overall quality of the area (the physical organisation) and the type of public security available defines whether older citizens will act to prevent criminal elements from taking possession of public spaces and thus exercise their social capital.

Finally another key element is the labour market. More and more studies indicate that the economy is related to violent crime and that the structure of the labour market in particular, plays a major role in crime: whether crime against persons (homicide) or against property (robbery and theft). We will begin by examining what happened in the city of São Paulo in terms of the reduction of social deficits, ever since the process of globalisation gained impetus in 1990 with the opening of the Brazilian internal market by the then president Fernando Collor de Mello.

The process of urbanization

Whereas most cities in Europe underwent processes of urbanization, meaning fast population growth, during the 18th culminating in the period of the Industrial Revolution -19th century, in the Americas, most cities began to grow at the end of the 19th century, and some became what is now known as mega cities, after the second half of the 20th century. This is also true of cities in Southeast Asia and in African countries.

Rapid urbanisation generally means that a consolidated, established city may co-exist with parts that are being created with different degrees of precariousness. The impact of this process will vary according with the local/state and federal (central) governments capacity to accommodate the newcomers, and to maintain the overall quality of life. The speed of this process of urbanization process represents a challenge, as it generally

implies that local authorities would have to provide for growing needs without necessarily having the resources to do so. As result, such cities present unstable combinations: areas that rival and/or emulate the cities of developed countries, as well as areas that are very similar to the descriptions of the cities in the poorest countries and whose description fit that of the slums occupied by workers in the 19th century in London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow, and so forth.

This intense population growth was due to migration from rural areas. This migration was the result of a “push and pull” mechanism. Populations were pushed from rural areas by lack of farming land, lack of jobs, changes in agricultural means of production and by natural disasters (droughts, floods and frosts). They were also attracted to cities by the mid (1960’s) industrialisation process led by the economic policies of the Military Regime then in power in Brazil that opted for a model of industrial development based on import substitution. As result incentives were given to the local industry creating tax barriers to imports or even prohibiting the import of certain goods, such as cars. The industries were given tax incentives and assured a market.

The other characteristic of this period is that the political regime, being an authoritarian one, had the power to impose its policies and to curtail labour demands. This in turn guaranteed that the move from rural to urban areas could take place without the risk of unrest or turmoil from crowds of needy citizens. Brazil was not the only country to experience this move from rural to urban in such political context: other Latin American countries had similar experience, as did many countries in Asia.

The people who moved to São Paulo from rural areas or other urban areas in Brazil, found homes the least economically desirable situations: areas distant from the centre of the city – the peripheries or near riverbanks, and streams- areas prone to flooding or too steep to build. This led planners to label this process of urbanization as a “segregational or exclusionary model” (Deak, 1999; Ribeiro and Lago, 1999; Valladares, 1990), because the newly arrived and their families were kept at a distance by the established city

Until the 1960’s São Paulo was a city where people did not feel fear. Children were allowed to play unsupervised in the streets. Young people from the middles classes: adolescents could go downtown on Saturday afternoons to the cinema matinee without panic on part of their parents. It was the sort of place where the bus driver knew his clientele, and would greet them from his bus, when he saw them walking down the road. In fact middle class children and adolescents made their way to school on public transport regularly, as private cars were not common, and even when families did possess one, taking children to school and back was not consider to be proper, only the extremely wealthy indulged in this.

Houses were still not surrounded by high walls. There were no private security companies, and no one insured a car, since car thefts were uncommon and car robberies unheard of. The most that people to dissuade a potential thief was to place a small plate in the façade of their houses stating that they were guarded by the Civil Patrol, the police in charge of patrolling the streets, and one that was respected by the citizens. The roots of today’s problems were probably being laid then, albeit not realized until recently.

Despite a series of economic crisis, São Paulo witnessed a long period of sustained economic growth. The economy of the city, state and country grew at record rates some years by 10%. This growth was even greater in the city itself that came to represent a major share of the country’s economy. To this date the economic prominence of São Paulo is such that the city’s budget is the third (in volume) in the country, after the federal government and that of the government of the state of São Paulo.

Between 1960 and 2000 the population in the city of São Paulo multiplied by 3 reaching 10,434,252 residents. In this period the country suffered changes in the political regime¹⁰, and most of the population in the country became urban. There were countless economic stabilization plans were implemented¹¹, and the country faced multiple challenges in the international contexts, as result of the different crisis the confronted the “not so developed economies”: oil crisis in the early 1970’s, the Mexican debt crisis, and again the currency crisis in 1998.

¹⁰ From democracy with a president (1960-1962) to parliamentary democracy (1962-1964), then a military coup installed a “exceptional regime” de facto a dictatorship with elections for lower positions in the Legislative (1964-1985), then back to democracy (1985).

¹¹ Cruzeiro, cruzeiro novo, cruzeiro, cruzado, novo cruzado, cruzeiro, real.

Population growth rates started to decline in the 1980's, at the same time that democratic transition started. Population growth in the city of São Paulo, dropped by more than half: from a high of on average 4,46% a year, during the 1970's, to an average of 1,16 % a year in the 1980's. This average was further reduced during the 1990's when it reached 0,88 a year. This was the consequence of a dual process: a reduction in the fertility rate and of migration from rural areas to the city. If population growth is reduced, and if there is a democratic regime in power it would be expected that collective movements would emerge and that social demands would be voiced. It was then expected that the accumulated inequalities would begin to be corrected. There were a few problems though, this drop in population growth was not homogeneous: while certain areas of the city lost population in the last 20 years (presented negative growth), other areas continued to grow at very high rates. As expected population growth declined in the wealthiest areas and continued to grow at high rates in the poorest ones.

Meanwhile the homicide rate, in the city of São Paulo, in the early 1960's was of 5,2 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants¹² by 1975¹³, when the population reached almost 6 million residents, reached 10,7 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants. The growth of homicide continued to grow in the next 25 years nearly doubling every ten years in São Paulo as seen on the table below (table 1) in 1980 there were 17,5 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants, 30,1 per 100,000 in 1990¹⁴ and by 2000 reached 57,2 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants¹⁵. Homicide apparently starts to grow with the rapid urbanisation process, while the economy was growing at very high rates and continues this growth despite the reduction in the speed of growth and throughout the process of economic liberalisation.

Table 1 The evolution of homicide in the city of São Paulo: 1960-2002

| Homicides in São Paulo 1960-2003 | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | number of Homicides | rate per 100,000 residents |
| 1960 | 179 | 5,2 |
| 1965 | 305 | 6,4 |
| 1970 | 542 | 9,1 |
| 1975 | 691 | 9,3 |
| 1980 | 1480 | 17,5 |
| 1985 | 3577 | 32,7 |
| 1990 | 4038 | 30,1 |
| 1996 | 4854 | 49,3 |
| 2000 | 5967 | 57,2 |
| 2002 | 5495 | 51,8 |

Sources: 1960-1975, Mello Jorge (1979), 1980-2002, Secretariat of Public Security, State of São Paulo.

Compared to the growth of other forms of violent crime, the weight of homicide in the violence that affects the city becomes more visible. Whereas the rates for other forms of violent crime have been relatively stable homicide and armed robberies have exploded. Drug trafficking has oscillated and here the police statistics are very difficult to explain as the police blame homicides on the drug trade but the apprehension of drug dealers and of drug user does not match the pattern for homicides, the three phenomena taking place in opposite districts of the city and neither do they seem to follow the intensity of the homicide

¹² Mello Jorge (1979) Mortalidade por causas externas em São Paulo- Ph.D. Thesis in Public Health at the University of São Paulo, (mimeo).

¹³ At this time the city was already recognised as part of a metropolitan region comprised of other 38 nearby municipalities.

¹⁴ Barata, et al (1999)

¹⁵ Fundação SEADE

problem. Similarly neither do the armed robberies that are reported¹⁶ to the police take place in high homicide rate areas.

**Table 2- Other violent crime rates (per 100.000 residents)
Metropolitan Region of São Paulo:
1981-2002**

| | robbery +death | Rape | Assault | Drug Trafficking | Armed robbery |
|------|-------------------|-------|---------|------------------|------------------|
| 1981 | 2,79 | 13,56 | 321,72 | 18,85 | 269,05 |
| 1985 | 1,86 | 11,34 | 334,72 | 30,5 | 513,45 |
| 1990 | 2,92 | 12,22 | 326,45 | 22,74 | 545,5 |
| 1996 | 2,3 | 10,39 | 364,09 | 16,68 | 523,96 |
| 2000 | 2,69 | 11,7 | 312,75 | 12,1 | 852,5 |
| 2002 | 1,6 | 11,8 | 313,28 | 22,53 | 879,79 |

Sources: Secretariat of Public Security of the State of São Paulo

Seade Foundation- Foundation of State System Data

Analysis- State of São Paulo Government

Most victims of homicide were in the past, and still are, poor, male youth living in the worse areas of this city. This raises a number of questions, since there are clear signs that not all was well in this city, since if the population was growing very fast, a fact that is known to produce some social disorganisation, the economy was also growing. What could explain the growth of violence in there were also multiple indicators that economic inequality was not being reduced by sheer economic growth. At the time the explanation presented was that the plentiful supply of labour moving from rural areas to the city, plus the restrictions imposed by the Military Regime on trade unions and on labour demands explained the continued inequality.

What has been witnessed in Brazil, and in a few Latin American countries (Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico) is that this is not so. Inequalities have survived despite the fact that some human development indicators have improved: access to treated water and sewage, electricity, transportation, communications, income, education (years of schooling), child mortality, and maternal health. Part of the reason why what is termed "social deficit" has not been reduced as expected lays on two factors: the reduced capacity of governments to invest (the pressures for fiscal austerity), the lifting of trade barriers -that resulted in major changes in the production processes and major lay off, and reductions in tax revenues for governments (Schiffer, 1999). All areas of public services have suffered: health, education and public security amongst them (Adorno and Cardia, 1998). As result urban areas now suffer health problems thought to have been solved for good: epidemics such as cholera, dengue have returned and now yellow fever is threatening to return.

If in 1985, Clarke could write that: "There is no easily demonstrable link between levels of crime and delinquency and levels of unemployment, educational position and so forth (Rutter and Giller, 1983). Nor is there any clear link between crime and urbanisation as shown by the example of Japan, which has now become a highly industrialised and urban society, but one with low rates of crime (Clifford, 1976)." the growth of violence in São Paulo seems to be related, at least for the period between 1960 and 1980, to the rapid process of urbanization. This process affects cities in at least key aspects for violence to prosper; it changes the age profile of the population resulting in large contingents of children and youth, this results in much pressure on all public services and on the job market as well, and in a context of extended periods of economic instability the impacts on communities can be quite adverse.

It seems a paradox that urbanization a word that has a strong positive connotation of improvement, of progress, of improved access to the fruits of technology and of civility should be associated with violence. But the process of urbanization seems marked by contradictions. Part of the connotations, attached to the

¹⁶ We must not forget we are interpreting data that is actually reported to the police, and we have little means to estimate the size of underreporting.

word, are true. There is much improvement to the lives of people who moved from rural areas to the cities¹⁷. There is improvement in income, in access to health and education, and information and in their participation in the consumer market. Also child labour is reduced as is “slave labour” (unpaid adult work-work done in exchange for food and shelter).

Despite all the positive aspects of a more urban society, today, residents in the city of São Paulo are fearful. It is estimated that the component security in the costs of production can represent as much as 15% of direct costs, depending on the product. São Paulo represents one of the largest markets in terms of armoured cars, has the third largest private fleet of helicopters, has an unknown numbers of personnel providing private security, as it estimated that around 60% of the private security companies are not registered and thus not controlled by the Ministry of Justice. Walls have gone up giving to many districts the appearance of populated by maximum security prisons. Houses and apartments are being equipped with an ever growing array of security gadgets of different degrees of visibility and subtlety: from security personnel that are supposed to have been trained by ex-members of the Israeli security forces, to closed circuit cameras (to be monitored by Internet), and electronic surveillance devices to barbed wire and leasing aggressive dogs. Parents of adolescents live at the edge of a nervous breakdowns with worry about the safety of their siblings. If they can afford they equip their children with mobile phones so they can monitor their whereabouts. Life has become very difficult and what seemed impossible not so long ago, such as hearing some one we knew had been murdered is not so impossible, or unthinkable. The fear of lethal violence and of kidnapping is widespread.

Violence in São Paulo: Homicides and socioeconomic deprivations.

Overlapping deprivations and the growth of homicide

Social economic inequality is associated to greater lethal violence. Studies done in Brazil with data series, over time by Piquet Carneiro (2000) for São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro confirms this expectation. Poverty, inequality and low educational level of the head of household were found to be associated to homicide. This was again the conclusion of study for São Paulo by the Municipal Secretariat of Labour (2002). What characteristics are shared by the areas that present very high homicide rates? Do we find indicators of the presence of concentrated disadvantages (Sampson et al., 1999) in high homicide areas? Such disadvantages represent risks for youth of violence and it is for this reason that violence prevention programmes advocate that interventions to prevent violence must be comprehensive and encompass the improvement of conditions of life for families, improve communities and schools.

The key question then is in how far has globalisation, as expressed in the liberalisation of the economy, promoted conditions for the primary prevention of violence by reducing the “social deficit” in São Paulo. Did the changes in the economy resulted in more public resources to invest in improving social conditions or not? It is also necessary to investigate whether globalisation had any effect on the repression of violence, either on the criminal justice system or in private security, as well as whether any of the violence in course in São Paulo is related to transnational crime.

In order to answer these questions we have to identify whether there have been changes in the patterns of concentration of disadvantages during this past decade. We will examine in particular those variables deemed to influence violence and crime directly and indirectly: income and educational level of the head of household, housing quality (crowding, access to infrastructure: telephone, water, electricity and sewerage) presence of groups vulnerable to violence (children and youth), schools and access to jobs, as well as the measures adopted by private citizens and by the state, finally we will focus on the labour market.

Neighbourhoods that concentrate disadvantages are thought to be conducive to more violence as this means that there will be multiple obstacles for social capital to manifest, in particular for adults to act in defence of vulnerable groups, as fewer people will feel efficacious enough to act or feel safe enough to

¹⁷ For instance in the 1980's there was the largest drop in child mortality in the Municipality of São Paulo while in 1980 deaths of children between 0 and 4 years of age represented 23,45% of all deaths in the city, by 1992 this percentage had dropped to 8,9%. This was largely due to improvements in access to water, sewage, massive campaigns to inoculate children, educational campaigns to promote breast feeding and to prevent dehydration, improved access to pre-natal care.

attempt to prevent the actions or presence of criminal elements in their community. In such neighbourhoods it is expected as result that there is less encouragement for collective action in general, which may explain why social economic and civil rights remain unfulfilled.

Homicide is the first cause of death of youth between 16 and 24 years of age in Brazil and in São Paulo. This violence is not evenly distributed across the city but it is concentrated in certain areas of the city. A recent study (Cardia, Adorno and Poleto, 2003) has shown that homicide, in general and that of youth in particular today take place in areas where there are large numbers of: youth and children, poorly educated heads of household, overcrowded housing, and where there is scarce access to jobs, less elderly people (less adult supervision for youth) and less access to health facilities and infrastructure (sewerage). This indicates that in São Paulo, homicide is related to the continued presence of overlapping deprivations. What remains to be seen is what happened during the 1990's in these areas, have social deficits been reduced, remained the same or on the contrary increased in this period as well as to explore the role that globalisation may have played in this process.

Concentration of poverty

The areas in which homicides concentrate present many similarities. It is expected that areas that concentrate young people, that lack amenities, lack access to jobs, face more economic stress will present higher homicide rates. A number of districts in São Paulo fit this pattern closely. The distribution of homicide in São Paulo was never been homogeneous but seems to be concentrating more and more in certain areas of the city. That the high homicide areas have remained the same throughout the decades is a testimony of the negligence of the authorities with their residents. Homicide rates are not only higher in these areas but they also grow faster, resulting in that the distance between the low homicide rate areas, and that of high rate ones is magnified. This growth type of growth is expected when impunity is present, combined with multiple sources of stress and with the deepening of deprivations. Violence that is not punished fosters more violence. This highlights the role that the criminal justice system and local administration have in curtailing this process of growth.

It is in the periphery of the city that homicide acquire the characteristic of an epidemic. The periphery are not the suburbs: they are the result of the efforts of the first generation migrants to find an abode in the city and the expression of the disregard of the city's administrators with their fate. Having arrived in the mid 1960's or in the late 1960's there is already a second generation born in the city and for this generation as well as the previous (maybe less so for them) the city is not proving to be a source of social mobility. It is very likely that homicides are the cruel face of this perception of stagnancy.

Homicide and inequality

Income

The city of São Paulo presents a very high level of concentration of poverty. If we analyse the income of heads of household for the period between 1996 and 2000, it is clear that in this period there was a growth of heads of household earning higher incomes and a growth of persons, in charge of families, with no income at all. More important for violence is that the growth of "no income was even larger in the high homicide areas. Improvements in income seem to have been mostly concentrated at the top of the pyramid, suggesting that the model of income concentration and inequality has persisted and made more perverse by the growth of heads of family with no income.

Table 3_ The evolution of income of heads of household: 1999-2000

| | 2000 | | 1996 | |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|
| | São Paulo Total | High homicide rate areas | São Paulo total | High homicide rate areas |
| Income (monthly) | % | % | % | % |
| no income | 10,4 | 13,9 | 4,8 | 5,5 |
| up to US\$ 250,00 | 29,6 | 35,4 | 36,8 | 42,3 |
| more than US\$1,800.00 | 9,4 | 4,3 | 7,2 | 4,2 |

Source: Census Bureau, 1991, 1996 and 2000

This is made more serious by the high concentrations of very poor people in a single territory, resulting in the physical segregation of the most needy groups. Data from the 2000 Census shows that half of the poor live in very high poverty areas, areas in which more than 50% of the population are very poor. Also, as seen previously, the numbers of heads of household with no income more than doubled between 1996 and 2000, reaching 10,4% of all heads of household in the city (while in 1996 they represented 4,8%). This is certainly mostly due to the high levels of unemployment and to the growth of the shadow (informal economy). This suggests that poverty has become more salient in certain areas of the city. These areas have much in common, besides the high homicide rates. That this growth has occurred as the process of economic stabilisation, and liberalisation suggests that not all groups in the population benefit from economic liberalisation equally.

Heads of household without an income suggest trouble: a head of household that is not earning has less power, and is more likely to have his/her authority challenged. It also means that youngsters are less likely to have successful role models inside their families to guide their aspirations and behaviour. It also means more tension within the family, as there is more economic uncertainty, and this is thought to feed violence. Alcohol and drug abuse are escape routes for the tensions caused by economic stress.

Without a proper job often heads of household have to go into to the informal job market to survive. This frequently translates in erratic earnings in areas where there is much competition: odd jobs in the building industry, working as street vendors, or in the informal transport system, or else working informally in small industries. What the different sources of informal income have in common, besides strong competition, is the lack of certainty about the duration and the amount of pay and the lack of access to social security.

On top of that, prolonged unemployment can affect relations between the family and neighbours, since the working ethics are widely disseminated and deeply rooted in the society and the poor neighbourhoods are no exception. The presence of adult males in public spaces, during the day, feeds gossip and this besides upsetting social bonds and damaging self-esteem can lead to increased consumption of alcohol and to violence. Lack of work affects families and the family structure, and this can be seen in the large increase in one parent families, mostly ran by women, particularly in the high homicide areas. One parent families endure more financial hardship, this results in more residential instability and this in turn in more risk of violence for the children and youth. New unions (stepfather or mother) are no assurance that the risks will be over (Lauritsen, 2003). On the contrary, risks seem to be greater for children in broken families that form another unit (Juby & Farrington, 2000).

Table 4- The evolution of family composition: 1991-2000
The family

| | 2000 | | 1991 | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| | São Paulo total | High homicide rate areas | São Paulo Total | High homicide rate areas |
| One parent family (mother) | % | % | % | % |
| | 29,1 | 27,6 | 20,8 | 17,3 |

Source: Census Bureau 1991 and 2000

This concentration of poverty and possibly of hopelessness is made worse when we recall that the data clearly indicates that this concentrated poverty is becoming more acute and serious as time goes by. Social economic deficits that were supposed to be reduced as society and the economy progressed, as the population growth rate was reduced, and as the State stopped interfering with the economy and let the market forces act, are apparently getting more serious and the reverberations felt by all are more frightening. Out of the 10,434, 252 people living in the city of São Paulo (Census 2000) slightly over one quarter (or 2,660,458 persons) lived in very high homicide areas. Comparing the data between 1991 and 2000 the data shows that in this period there was the consolidation of process of economic exclusion that started in the 1960's, suggesting that whatever policies to foster social and economic inclusion were designed (and implemented) in the period did not succeed and even the little of social mobility that existed seems to have been seriously

affected. Having concentrations of poor people with hope to improve ones' lot in is one thing, having massive numbers of poor people living together, without hope of improvement is another.

Education

The concentration of poverty goes hand in hand with the concentration of poorly educated heads of household, this in part helps to explain the lower incomes. Parental low educational level represents a risk to children as it reduces the probability that children will achieve their full potential in school. Contrary to what happened with income, there was a major reduction in poorly educated heads of household in the 9 years interval between the two Census (1991 and 2000). On average, in the city, the poorly educated heads of household (having 4 or less years of education) fell from nearly one quarter (22%) to 17,8% of all heads of household. This represents a drop of 19% in the percentage of less educated heads of household.

Table 5- Changes in education level: 1991-2000

| | 2000 | | 1991 | |
|------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| | São Paulo total | High homicide rate areas | São Paulo total | High homicide rate areas |
| Education -head of household | % | % | % | % |
| four years or less | 17,8 | 21,8 | 22,0 | 27,9 |
| 15 years or more | 14,1 | 8,8 | 13,1 | 7,4 |

Source: Census Bureau, 1991 and 2000

Unfortunately, similarly to income, this drop is not homogeneous and in districts of the city, for instance, there are still more poorly educated heads of household (with 4 years of schooling or less) in the high homicide rates areas. Conversely such districts often houses only a fraction of the better educated (15 years or more of education) heads of household 88% against the city's average of 14,1% of heads of household with 15 years or more of schooling. This does not mean that there has been no improvement in education, but that it was not enough to reduce the distance between the districts and the city's average. As result while in 1991 35,9% of all the poorly educated heads of household in the city lived in these high homicide areas by 2000 this percentage reached 43,05%.

Poorly educated heads of household will find greater competition for less skilled jobs, in particular when the industrial sector has suffered major technological changes which resulted in the disappearance of less skilled jobs, as is the case of São Paulo. Jobs are very scarce in high violence areas, most of the areas do not provide employment for the people who live there. In fact, when we mapped job availability in the city it became clear that jobs are concentrated in the areas where most of the wealthier, higher educated, and older population is. This concentration of opportunities expresses the lack of social and economic policies to encourage entrepreneurs to invest in the poorer areas. Without external incentives, local businessmen will not take the risk of investing in areas where people have limited power to consume, moreover when there is so much violence. Left to the forces of the market the vicious cycle of poverty, lack of jobs and violence will continue. Youth and children's incentives to do well in school and to remain in school is closely related to their parents education. If parents have a poor education they can not provide as much incentive to their children.

Homicide and population growth

Social cohesion is considered to be major source of protection against violence that victimizes children and youth. This, in turn, is thought to be affected by the degree of stability of the population in the area – the rate by which the population grows is supposed to give some indication as to changes in the composition of the population. The population growth rate has been falling in the city since 1980. Still in the high homicide areas the drop in population growth was not as large as the city's average. In those areas there was a smaller reduction and as result the areas more than the rest of the city. Data from the year 2000 Census tells us data in all of the high homicide districts- except for the inner city areas (that are losing population),

the population growth rate is many times that of the average for the city: 0,88 percent a year. In some of the districts analysed this growth is 8 times that of the average for the city. This means that existing deficits continue to grow also due to this localised pattern of population growth.

It does not surprise that these districts continue to present larger numbers of children and youth than other districts of the city, as well as less older people. As result 42% of all small children (0 to 4 years of age) in the city, live in the high homicide areas. The same pattern is true for older children and for youth and teens: they are over represented in the high homicide areas. Two consequences from this greater presence of children and youth the two most vulnerable groups to violence: more pressure on public services that could protect them from violence such as crèches, local schools, adult supervised after school activities and for programs to prevent violence in general and secondly this large presence of vulnerable groups in a high risk situation suggests that there is much opportunity for this group to be exposed violence and suffer all the physical and psychological consequences, which in turn could mean more violence in the future. Less income means parents have to struggle more to insure their children's survival which in practice results in many parents being forced to leave their children unattended by other adults. Larger numbers children and adolescent, in relation to adults, also suggests there are less adults, to supervise their activities and keep them away from trouble in sum to intervene for their protection. Of course none of this is directly related to economic liberalisation except in that which refers to the local government capacity to carry out the adequate investments in the area. This capacity in turn is determined by the revenues from taxation, by the previous economic commitments made by the government and by the constraints imposed on local governments' fiscal policies as result of the national policies and these will be affected by globalisation. In the case of Brazil to improve its financial standing a number of agreements were made with the IMF that severely limit investments by governments at all levels: municipal, state and federal level.¹⁸

Greater population growth results in ever growing net population density (persons per hectare in the urban area): while there were 114,9 persons per hectare in 1991 in the city, by 2000 this number had risen to 121,9. Again this growth was skewed and much greater in the high homicide areas where it has reached on average 146,4 persons per hectare.

Table 6: Density and housing crowding: 1991 and 2000

| | 2000 | | 1991 | |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| | São Paulo Total | High homicide rate areas | São Paulo Total | High homicide rate areas |
| The community | % | % | % | % |
| Density | 121,9 | 146,4 | 114,9 | 133,6 |
| crowding | | | | |
| Persons per house | 3,46 | 3,65 | 3,74 | 3,89 |
| Persons per room | 0,64 | 0,77 | 0,7 | 0,86 |

Source: Census Bureau 1991 and 2000

In terms of house crowding the high homicide rates districts continue to present the same trend, there is some improvement but this is smaller than that of the city as a whole. Housing crowding is a serious problem as it affects children and adults. It means that family members have no privacy to exercise different functions, that children and youth very likely lack proper areas to concentrate and do home work. This encourages conflict within the family, tensions and more opportunities for friction as competition for scarce space

¹⁸ The Fiscal Responsibility Law determines that governments, at all levels cannot invest more than a certain percentage of their revenue. To enforce the legislation acting governors and mayors have been made personally liable of criminal prosecution should they overspend. All expenditure, whether investments in infrastructure by the administration or by state enterprises (such as some utilities as Water companies), are accounted as part of the state debt and added to the equation that determines the ceiling of state expenditure.

develops. Data on slums in this period give much ground for concern. In this period slums grew across the city, probably as the result of families not being able to afford rented accommodation.

Table 7- The growth of slums between 1990 and 2000

| The growth of slums 2000/1990 percentage growth of : | São Paulo total % | High homicide Rate areas % |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| land occupied by slums | 24,0 | 11,1 |
| Population in slums | 30,0 | 41,0 |
| houses in slums | 47,0 | 28,0 |
| Population density | 5,0 | 71,0 |
| Persons per house | 18,0 | 59,0 |

Source: São Paulo Municipal Secretariat of Housing, 2003

In the high homicide areas the actual area (in square meters) that is occupied by slums (defined as land that is illegally occupied), has grown less than the city's average, but the existing area has become far more densely occupied because the population by 40% in already existing slums. The result is that in the high homicide areas the number of residents per hectare has grown by 70% in 10 years and the number of persons per house by almost 60%. This level of crowding in very precarious circumstances signal to the persistence of violence. This problem was identified in the mid 1990's and, since little has been done in terms of developing housing alternatives or providing access to low income forms of mortgages, it reveals one of the limits of the potential impacts of globalisation on daily life. The real estate market seems to be untouched by the process of economic liberalisation in São Paulo very much against what has been experienced elsewhere.

Vayrynen (2003) recalls, that one of the characteristics of the global city is that " manufacturing has largely disappeared from it and been replaced by FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), along with various expert services catering to transnational business". In São Paulo though finance and insurance have become more international the same is not true of real estate, for housing and for office space. The only sector that seems to have been very much influenced by foreign investment and know how is the hotel business. In the last ten years the number of very high class hotels in São Paulo and other cities in the Metropolitan Area have multiplied, all managed by foreign groups mostly European and North American ones.

The levels of crowding identified in the poorer and even in some middle class areas suggest that there is an unsatisfied demand for housing. This remains not attractive to foreign investors probably due to the extremely high interest rates which result in credit for housing being almost prohibitive.

Access to infrastructure

Between 1991 and 2000 there was some improvement in residents access to sewerage, a major public health problem in the city, as the sewerage collection and treatment facilities did not follow the extension of access to treated water in the poorest areas of the city. As result when treated, piped water arrived greater volumes of used water were thrown in open air or into rivers and streams. Between 1991 and 2000, the high homicide areas did experience a large improvement in the access to sewerage connections, but the most impressive expansion of infrastructure was in access to fixed telephone lines. The table below (table 8) shows how telephone expanded in this period: while in 1991 just 9 out of 100 residents had access to a telephone line in the high homicide areas, in 2000 this number had multiplied by 6. This was the result of the privatisation of the telecommunications system as was the expansion of the mobile phones estimated to reach 100 million of residents in Brazil at present.

Access to telecommunications in a precarious job situation is a key element for workers to survive. Mobile telephones have become a basic tool for people to do odd jobs and work on a piecemeal basis, it is their contact with the market.

Table 8- Evolution of the access to some infrastructure- telephones and sewerage: 1991 and 2000

| Infrastructure | São Paulo | High | São Paulo | High |
|----------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| | Total | homicide | Total | homicide |
| | % | rate areas | % | rate areas |
| sewerage | 87,4 | 79,6 | 87,1 | 72,1 |
| telephone | 66,3 | 57,2 | 13,9 | 9,2 |

Source: Census Bureau 1991 and 2000

Overlapping deprivations and exposure to violence

The fact that lethal violence overlaps with the violation of social and economic rights¹⁹ is not new, nor exclusive to Brazilian Metropolitan areas. This overlap was, and still is, to some degree, present in working class quarters in European cities in the 19th Century as well as is present in many cities throughout Latin America and Africa. The presence of more violence, in contexts in which deprivations overlap, is common even in contexts in which there is less inequality than what is found in Brazil, and where some form of welfare state still exists such as Norway (Pedersen, 2001). Still Brazilian Metropolises, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, differ from other places by the scale of the tragedy. It is in the death of youngsters by homicide, that the cruelty of the gross inequality of opportunities within the country becomes more visible and that its human toll can no longer be denied.

The Census data presented here strengthen the idea that at the macro level, the increased risk for youth in certain areas of the city may be the result of poverty combined with unemployment and little access to justice: to the protection by the police forces. Poor families are confronting multiple challenges without a modicum of social safety network. Prolonged unemployment of heads of household may be causing deep changes in ethics, values and beliefs of youth. Lack of opportunities for their parents and for themselves are curtailing dreams of social mobility or even physical mobility: moving out of violent neighbourhoods.

Lack of opportunities to move are leading to increased density and overcrowding – factors that have been found to increase the risk of victimization (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994; Evans et al. 2000). Also the demographic profile of the areas indicate that there are few adults in position to supervise and provide surrogate paternal/maternal forms of support and control: to be sources of protection by youth living in such areas.

Still this picture is being drawn based on aggregated data derived from the census. From this data we are inferring that since the areas are lacking in access to jobs and services, that the people living in there will be under greater stress and that the presence of multiple deficits in the neighbourhoods may be fostering competition between the people living in there and this could be a source of risk of violence. This kind type of link can only be examined at the micro level with data from surveys or interviews. The little we know from this only reiterates the picture described above. Our surveys (1999, 2001 and 2003) reveal the growth of exposure to violence as a bystanders and as victims. They also reveal that youth are over represented the group exposed to very serious violence -meaning that the person was exposed to repeated events of serious violence involving themselves or a close relative. Over half (51%) of the persons exposed to very very serious violence are between 16 and 24 years of age. One of the most worrying data is that this younger group is not only more exposed to violence that affects them and their families but also knows more youngsters like themselves who are more often victims and aggressors: almost half of them know someone their age that killed someone, and 3/4 know someone that had his/her life threatened. This suggests that there is some groups effect in course here. When parents are so involved with ensuring the family's survival it does not surprise that youngsters spend most of their time with their peers. The fact that this may increase the risks that they become victims or aggressors does demand that we examine the roots of this self selection: what is drawing these youngsters together and how can the negative effects be neutralized..

Another worrying data is that the group that is exposed to very, very serious violence differs from the others in their socioeconomic profile: they have more years of schooling and higher family income than the average. This suggests that in areas of overlapping deprivations repeated exposure to violence may be

¹⁹ Rights recognized as such by The Brazilian Constitution: the right to education, to housing, to health, to a life with dignity.

victimizing more often groups that are doing better, in terms of overcoming existing limitations. Since it was also found that the greater exposure to violence increases the dissatisfaction with their neighbourhood and suggests a certain emotional detachment (disaffiliation) from their surroundings, the likelihood that people, who are have more resources, provide leadership for collective actions to reduce the existing deprivations is also reduced. Violence could be hindering the potential for cohesion, and for action for change, that from the communities themselves and as such blocking initiatives for change.

Still we know very little about youth living in such challenging circumstances, who is providing role models for them, what kind of attachment they have to their parents and to school, how they assess their reality, or how they perceive the future, and their place in this future. We know that they have conventional values: complete school, get a job, start a family, help their parents. We do not know how their values translate into expectations: hope of fulfilment or fear of frustration, or yet what kind of experience they are having once they attempt to join the labour market. An experience the literature is suggesting to us that is one of the keys to understanding their possible involvement with deviance.

What the data about some key variables associated to urban violence suggest is that, throughout the 1990's the gains from the economic liberalisation process were not enough to refrain a process of growing violence that had started in the earlier decades. The data also suggest that failure to put a stop to the growth of violence is probably the result of the failure of local governments to invest in crucial areas in order to prevent violence from occurring. It remains to be seen what happened with the repression to violence: how successful is the criminal justice system in punishing perpetrators and thus providing de-incentives for further violence and if and how the globalisation has effected this performance.

Access to public security and justice

Between 1991 and 2000 there were 51.285 homicides²⁰ (Ministry of Health-Datasus) in the city of São Paulo. In only 15,5% of the cases the identity of the aggressors was known at the time the police recorded the case. In areas of high homicide rates this percentage drops to only 8,5% of the cases with aggressors known. The vast majority of these cases was not cleared within a year, and mostly remain unsolved, and this feeds a vicious cycle: a person is killed, the culprits remain free, the police appears not to be very motivated. Relatives have to bear their pain and their anger and this may feed more violence. This impunity is considered to be a powerful fuel of further violence. In one on going research project with the aim to measure the size of impunity by Adorno and Izumino (2004) at the Centre for the Study of Violence the authors have identified that of all criminal cases recorded by the police in São Paulo between 1991 and 1997 only 6,45 of the cases resulted in a formal police investigation (i.e a proper police inquiry was opened). By law, when a homicide case is reported to the police this report should automatically result in an inquiry, still this investigation is revealing that only 69,5% of the cases reported in the period under analysis resulted in an inquiry. The authors are projecting that roughly only 10,8% of homicide cases may result in a trial and sentencing. If this is correct impunity and its persistence, should be powerful stimuli for further violence.

Impunity is also the result of how human resources are distributed. The likelihood of cases being cleared is also related to the actual resources made available by the police to the different areas of the city. The two police forces: the Civil (Judiciary Police) and the Military Police (the uniformed/preventive police) do not seem to distribute their personnel according to need: the average ratio of police officers to residents is of 1 police officer (Military police) per group of 500 residents, and 1 police officer from the investigative police force per group of 1.531 residents. In the areas with very high homicide rates there are on average, 3 times less Military Policemen and Investigative Policemen. If we consider that the few policemen in the areas are confronted with, on average, twice the work load of their colleagues assigned elsewhere, it does not surprise that the rate of impunity in high homicide areas is much higher.

The growth of violent urban crime resulted in pressure for the police to improve its performance. Public outcry grew when members of the economic, political, cultural and social elite, members of the media, well known entrepreneurs became victims of violence. The state increased its investments in the area: more

²⁰ Meanwhile between 1993 and 2001 there were 11,067 cases of drug trafficking recorded by the police roughly about 1000 cases a year. National surveys on drug use in Brazil reveal that the use of drugs in Brazil is a fraction of that in the USA and in European countries and that within Brazil the largest consumption of drug takes place in Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, the southern most state (Galduróz et al, 2001).

personnel, more cars and more arms were made available in the period. Both police forces grew in size: more police officers, more technicians (table 5), and more experts and by 2002 there were 127.000 police officers in the state (Military and Civil). This represented a 21% growth since 1995 to provide public security to 36 million residents in the state. New and more plentiful equipment, and more incentives (collective life insurance, provision of bullet proof vests, easier access to housing mortgages for police officers, real rise in wages - over inflation rates and so forth) were also made available to the polices. Also the number of jails and prisons, including a number of maximum security jails, multiplied .

This had costs and quickly the expenditures with public security in the state of São Paulo surpassed that of health, social welfare, housing, infrastructure, environment, science and technology. It is the third largest item in the state budget, after education and the payroll of civil servants. Between 1995 and 2000 expenditures with public security jumped from representing 6,37% of the state budget to 10,61% in 2001.

If police forces are better staffed and have more material resources to investigate, it is expected that abusive use of lethal violence will be reduced. Unfortunately this does not seem to be the case. Brazilian police forces, in general, are known to regularly abuse lethal force. This has resulted in cases brought against Brazil in Human Rights Courts, such as the Inter American Court of Human Rights of the American Organisation of States (AOS), for gross human rights violations. Most of cases have involved the Military Police forces in different states, in particular that of São Paulo. Accusations of torture by police forces also continue to be made. The Special Rapporteur on Torture, for the United Nations, Sir Nigel Rodley, in 2001, addressing the issue torture in Brazil in police precincts and in enclosed institutions: prisons and institutions for young offenders, made clear that torture, in such institutions was institutionalised and a routine practice.

The state of São Paulo, by law, must produce every three months, a report on casualties of civilians in situations defined by the police as “resistance to prison” or “conflict”. Since 1996 the number of civilians killed by the Military Police has almost tripled. Data for the first six months in 2003 show that this trend continues. Contrary to what is expected, the number of people killed is always higher than that of people injured, indicating that the Military Police is using arms to kill and not to stop suspects. The ratio of police officers injured relative to those who are killed, follows what is expected from such confrontations, on average there are 10 police officers injured to one killed in action. The Civil Police record on the use of force follows the pattern of the Military Police but in smaller scale.

Table 9-Casualties: Civilian and Police Officers

Metropolitan Region of São Paulo: 1996-2002

| <i>Military Police</i> | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Persons killed in conflict with the Military Police | 128 | 176 | 196 | 266 | 407 | 303 | 435 |
| Persons injured in conflict | 153 | 158 | 168 | 172 | 170 | 227 | 235 |
| Military Police Officer killed in action | 17 | 18 | 15 | 28 | 17 | 24 | 24 |
| Military Police Officers injured in action | 315 | 263 | 391 | 352 | 238 | 299 | 276 |
| <i>Civil Police</i> | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Persons killed in conflict with the Civil Police | 22 | 6 | 22 | 49 | 43 | 41 | 43 |
| Persons injured in conflict | 22 | 14 | 20 | 42 | 43 | 57 | 17 |
| Civil Police Officers killed in action | 15 | 9 | 5 | 21 | 10 | 13 | 9 |
| Civil Police Officers injured in action | 21 | 27 | 43 | 44 | 46 | 50 | 34 |

Sources: Secretariat of Public Security of the State of São Paulo

This poor performance by the police forces generated opportunities for private security groups. Still do the costs most private security companies provide services for businesses, industries, and commerce, and the few wealthier citizens. There is much confusion about the numbers involved in this area: how many companies and how many personnel. Part of the lack of transparency is the reputed involvement of policemen/women moonlighting or as shareholders in private security, both conditions being illegal. There is a number of clandestine private security companies operating and this is reputed to be growing as the Federal

Police the agency that by law should oversee the activities of this sector inspecting, monitoring, granting operating licences or removing them, is clearly not fulfilling this mandate.

The growth of violence has provided a market for a number of international companies: companies that assess risks, companies that provide equipment and monitor the transport of cargo by satellite, companies that provide electronic surveillance monitoring equipment and that either sell or install security equipment, and companies that armour cars. Once in the country the specific needs of customers lead them to develop more innovations in this field. As result a number of very specialised car armoured facilities have emerged in the last few years, capable of armoured a breadth of cars from cheaper models to more expensive ones and which in turn are now exporting this know-how to other Latin American countries and to conflict regions such as Iraq.²¹

Labour market and crime

If urban violence is not being prevented at primary level and if the power of the criminal justice system to inhibit it is reduced we should look at the broader context in order to explore what other processes are in course in society either to assist in reducing violence by “spontaneous” means, i.e. will offer some counterpoint to the overall conditions, or else that may be enhancing the negative context. A number of studies have been exploring the connections between the nature of the labour market and crime and between this and globalisation.

Currie, quoted by Rotman (2000), compared violent crime in the USA, the former Soviet bloc and some developing countries and concluded that globalisation as the expansion of market society fosters violent crime because the “progressive destruction of livelihood-the long term absence of opportunities for stable and rewarding work, especially for the young”- by far the more vulnerable group since “Youth and crime are so strongly linked because adolescence is a limbo between childhood dependence and adult maturity: energies are high, outlets are few, needs are keenly felt, and authority is to be tested and resisted.” (Downes, 1998). Also some features of market societies would enhance crime because:

- would tend to increase inequality and this has been found to be closely related to crime;
- would erode informal support networks encouraging physical mobility- breaking up families and friendship ties;
- foster competition that erodes community values, encourages competition, social irresponsibility and callousness;
- foster deregulation including of what Currie calls the “technology of violence” meaning the circulation of firearms in a society.

The nature of the labour market, and the opportunities that it generates or that it fails to generate, seem to be key elements in the connection between globalisation and violence. But what elements of the labour market that can have such negative effects? Crutchfield and Pitchford (1997) have produced one of the most important researches in this field. What they attempted to answer was how “employment or lack of employment influences the degree of one’s involvement with crime”²². Their results point to the importance, not only of employment versus unemployment, but also of the patterns of employment: “people with intermittent employment, low income and little chance for improving their lot will have less stakes in conformity.”²³

This is roughly the same conclusion reached by Catalano and Novaro (1997), after studying the impact of job loss on violence: “workers will regulate their aggressive behavior when they fear for their jobs”. But jobs have to be attractive enough to produce fear of losing them. It is not only the nature of the work and

²¹Most of the equipment used is imported, though there is a growing national industry of electronic surveillance equipment: 50% is imported from the USA, 20% from Israel, 20% from Japan, 5% from Canada and 5% from other countries. (Folha de S.Paulo, 16/10/2000.)

²² The authors worked with longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth: the labor market Experience. The data refers to two cohorts: 1966 and 1979. The variables used were: personal traits, respondents’ employment characteristics, age, race, marital status, education and crime self report.

²³ Negative effects of less structured jobs, affect not only low paid workers studying the impact of fixed term labor contract, marginal employment and part time work on workers health in Britain and in Germany, Rodriguez (2002) concluded that unstable and temporary job schemes can create feelings of insecurity, and that chronic psychological distress which may have an impact on health.

the pay that affects people but the nature of the contract, the commitment that is made to them: what is expected of him/her and what is pledged to him/her. It is this exchange that will signal to the person whether it is worthwhile the adherence to the legal world or not. This is not just a decision made on the basis of their individual experience, the broader context counts as well: how are the others' like him/herself faring is also relevant. There is a major group effect to be considered: "living where large numbers of people are not gainfully employed is itself a criminogenic influence".

What happens to adult employment is also relevant to youth, as pointed by McGahey (quoted by Crutchfield and Pitchford, 1997) "persistent unemployment among adults weakens informal social controls in neighborhoods, which in turn leads to increased delinquency among the young". Adults provide roles models, what is happening to them provides youth with a glimpse of their own future can be like. The authors are highlighting the socialization role that work has for youth both as means for their insertion in adult world as well as in the definition of their social identify and in their self-respect: "rising pressures to consume, combined with falling expectations of productive employment, spell a particularly corrosive sense of exclusion" says Downes (1998). More than jobs or no jobs is the nature of jobs, the nature of the contract and the future that it signals that matters: if people are not willing to invest in you in the long run why should you comply? Why should you introject norms and rules if others do not do the same to you? What inhibits crime in Crutchfield and Pitchford's view is not just work, it is the possibility of a better future that prevents crime.

Crutchfield and Pitchford's work inaugurated a series of researches on the links between the job market and violence. Shihadeh and Ousey (1998) focused on the role that industrial restructuring which eliminates low-entry level employment- less skilled work, plays in violence. In the past it was this type of work that allowed social mobility for the poor. Industrial restructuring has all but vanished this type of work. What the authors examined was the indirect relationship between industrial work in major cities and homicide rates over a 20 years period. Their results show that the more low entry level jobs were lost the higher the violence. Their conclusion follows on the path of the authors listed above: it is not only the labour market that is restructured, communities undergo major social economic transformations as result: the capacity of the community to control its members is weakened. Not only were low skilled jobs reduced but the few openings that remain are found outside large urban centres. Inner city residents were left with jobs that have much higher educational requirements for which local residents are not prepared. Since there is much competition for the few jobs that remain, the pay is low, benefits are scarce and security is frail. Another major problem highlighted by the authors is the question of the concentration of unemployed, underemployed or out of the labour force in a single community and the dearth of positive role models for youth in the area: isolated from economic opportunities and from models how can the young believe in social mobility, how can they dream of a different future- the forces that would drive them to comply as they could constitute the terrain in which their self-esteem and self-worth could develop without risk?

The relations between the job market and violence were further explored by Bellair and Roscigno (2000) now tracing the connections between the opportunities (or lack of) of the labour market and delinquency. Again working with longitudinal survey data (National Educational Longitudinal Survey and US County Data on labour markets) the authors explored the links between the structure of the labour market, income, family "intactness", and adolescents' attachment to parents and to school. The authors concluded that as adolescents move through school, in a context of low paid work in the service sector or of unemployment , they disengage themselves from school and family increasing the risk of getting involved in delinquency. This risk increases with time, for the gap between their school achievement, and the markets demands from them also increases. They may, then, fall in the vicious cycle described by Crutchfield and Pichtford.

Another element for violence is the impact that changes in the nature of the labour market bring to families since : *"the social conditions to which families and individuals are exposed and thus respond stem largely from the type of employment opportunities available. Because income and family structure are partially shaped by the availability of legitimate employment, the structure and functioning of local labour markets should be, logically speaking, fundamental in terms of foci. Family economic well-being and structure are, in turn, consequential for adolescent attachments to important social-control structures -- processes that are too often treated as exogenous in delinquency studies"* (Bellair and Roscigno, 2000).

If in the USA the restructuring of the industrial sector has had such impact what can we estimate that is happening in the emerging economies? This is what Eilat and Zinnes (2002) did analysing “transition economies” to assess the size and impact of the “shadow economy” and its effects. The “shadow” or informal sector functions in the short term as a buffer preventing social convulsion, as people manage to survive despite massive unemployment, as exemplified in the case of Poland where the authors identified an official unemployment rate of 16% in the absence of street riots. It is an efficient survival strategy that may hinder society in the long run: not subjected to requirements/standards it can harm the public and workers and it can also lead to illegal activities.

What effect has this type of unemployment on the socialization of youth to work? Little is known as the study only sought to identify the impact that this economy had on economic competitiveness and in the effectiveness of policy measures. Still a informal or shadow economy is a major problem throughout Latin America, and one that has grown over the years as result of: industrial restructuring, the disappearance of low skill jobs and the growth in productivity as we will see further ahead.

The role that the labour market plays in criminal violence has also been explored from the perspective of inequality and of economic growth. Several studies have focussed on these topic more recently including a number from The World Bank in an attempt to explain the growth of urban violence in Latin America. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loyaza in particular, have written extensively on this issue. In one of their more recent papers (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loyaza, 2000) they examined crime and victimization from an economic perspective. They carried out a cross country analysis (between 45 and 34 countries were compared) covering a period of 24 years: between 170 and 1994. The analysis sought to explain the rates of violent crime (homicide and robberies) in respect to their explanatory model which included- out put growth rate, average income, level of income inequality, average educational attainment of the adult population, lagged crime rate, the presence of deterrence factors (police presence, legislation concerning capital punishment) presence of illegal drugs (production of drugs in the country, rate of drug possession, degree of urbanization and age composition of the population) and a component that was to measure inequality: educational inequality, income polarization and ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. Their conclusions corroborate much of what previous authors identified:

- 1- criminal behaviour is not induced by level of poverty, but rate of poverty alleviation is a significant determinant of violent crime;
- 2- past incidence of crime is a significant determinant of violent crime, i.e. Crime waves do exist and the reasons: “ *costs of performing criminal activities decline over a given time;... social interactions with other criminals encourage further criminal acts....job opportunities in the legal market are likely to be reduced by the stigma associated with past criminal records....*” similarly to Crutchfield and Pichtford (1997);
- 3- the police and the judiciary fail to bring people to justice and thus to deter;
- 4- lack of economic growth encourages crime- “*By increasing the availability of job opportunities and rising wages...economic growth has a crime reducing effect.....that this result holds not only for robberies but also homicide..... may indicate that an important fraction of homicides results from economically motivated crimes that become violent.*”²⁴

As for the relationships between inequality and violent crime they also state that: “Income inequality has a significant and independent impact on intentional homicide and robbery rates”. The bad news, is that in their projections is that once inequality is controlled, violent crime still continues to rise as a lagged effect. If educational achievement improves and if income opportunities do not follow, again violent crime may rise. This means that authorities have to continue their efforts to reduce violent crime despite the fact that the numbers continue to rise. The message the authors have is that left to their own devices crime is self perpetuating, crime waves exist, economic growth can be effective to fight crime, education as well if economic opportunities exist.

²⁴ The authors are so sure of this relationship that they even estimate that a 1% increase in GDP growth rate would result in a 2.4% decline in homicide in the short run and a 13.7% drop in robberies.

What is the specific role that globalisation may play in this labour market? If economic growth is so vital to reduce crime, once crime is rooted in a society, in how far can globalisation promote economic growth, an antidote to crime? Kentor (2001), based on data from The World Bank "World Development Indicators" did a cross country analysis to test whether globalisation produced modernization or dependency. He analysed 88 developing countries, defined as those that had a per capita GNP of less than US\$ 10,000 (1980), to conclude that although globalisation (operationally defined as foreign capital investment) has, on the short term, a positive impact in terms of trade openness, in the long run it has a negative impact on per capita GNP growth. Governments, in the first place, are forced to carry out a number of economic reforms to become attractive to foreign capital, this has broad social, political and economic consequences. Foreign capital tends, in his analysis, to concentrate on single products, tends to promote social polarization, as it pays more for highly skilled workers, and it also tends to repatriate profits instead of re-investing them, promoting the loss of capital of these economies that meanwhile may have become very dependent of the same capitals.

Another, more localized study, about the impact of globalisation on inequality is case study by Kaplinsky and Morris (2002) about wages in the furniture industry in South Africa as result of lifting trade barriers. The authors show that despite the fact that furniture producers in South Africa have "significantly" increased production their revenues in dollars have not followed. In fact they have experienced a fall in the price per unit. This experience is not unique to the furniture manufacturing and it is not a result of lack of technology or of compliance with modern standards (environmental codes etc.) and so forth, the sector has invested in modernizing, and increasing productivity as have the clothing and leather goods, all with the same result.²⁵

Despite all the bad news about globalisation there is one good news: globalisation not only improves democracy, human rights, information dissemination, science and cultural expressions, if for adults it does not necessarily improves work conditions or wages, it does not increase child labour. Cigno and Rosati (2002), also analyzing The World Bank World Development Indicators for the past 20 years concluded that globalisation does not raise child labour. This is not a small achievement but a remainder that the achievements of globalisation are certainly far more complex and ambiguous.

Globalisation and the labourmarket in Brazil

Recently a Brazilian daily newspaper quoted a managing director of the IMF Eduardo Aninat who in an interview for the Mexican newspaper El Financiero would have said that "Globalisation is a positive but an incomplete (process). It has been only 12 or 13 years of a process of which we have seen but a third."²⁶ So far this incomplete process has left some marks in the Brazilian economy. It is difficult to ascertain how we should take this statement by the representative of the IMF: as an opportunity waiting for us in the horizon or as threat around the corner? What has happened to the labour market in Brazil as result of the "economic opening up", "trade liberalization", submission to the Washington Consensus", "adoption of neo-liberalism" as the process has been named by different interlocutors.

Firstly the country had to in Kentor's word "make itself attractive" which meant economic restructuring in order to ensure economic stability or the elimination of inflation. The policies adopted were orthodox meaning high interest rates and for some time keeping an overvalued currency and then allowing the currency to float, strong control over expenditures - a new legislation was approved to prevent city mayors and state governors to spend more than their tax revenues (penalties for violating the legislation involving jail sentences) and thus prevent states and cities from running into debt.

Economic restructuring resulted in massive process of de-nationalisation of industries through mergers, buy-outs or joint ventures (Miranda, 2001). Multinationals corporations that had 35% of the revenues of the 350 largest groups in Brazil in 1991 buy 1999 had 53,5% of this revenue. Multinationals grew by estimated 146% in this period. It was expected that this increased presence would result in more exports

²⁵ The authors point to the role that buyers play in this process and to the myth that comparative advantages could exist in this day and age when: international capital is very mobile, there is not full employment in all countries that are part of the equation, trade accounts between countries are not balanced and winners are not compensating the losers nor facilitating their restructuring.

²⁶ Folha Online October 7th, 2002.

but this was not so: being large companies they also import a great deal, export moderately and repatriate their profits. The growth of multinationals was even larger in the services sector banking in particular: in 1991 the foreign banks' share of the sector was 8%, by 1999 this share had nearly tripled reaching 21,3%. In some sectors as result massive groups were formed representing almost oligopolies not only in manufacturing but in commerce as well. Toy manufacturers, for instance, claim that toy retail is so concentrated that 20 buyers represent 65% of the business (Costa, 2001). Globalisation was expected to result in the opposite: in increased competition and as such in reduced prices. It was also expected to improve the quality of products, the design, improve technology, in sum give consumers greater range of choice at better price.

The impact of trade liberalization on the labour market

Soares, Servo and Arbache (2001) analysed the impact of trade liberalization on the labour market. Brazil reduced import tariffs from a high of 67,8% in 1987 to on average 16,2% by 1998. Still Brazil's foreign trade exposure is not extremely high in fact in 1997 it was estimated to be 13% (Green, Dickerson and Arbache, 2001). The questions the authors asked were: is trade liberalization exporting work? What is the impact of trade liberalization on the structure of the labour market, of wage inequality, and in income distribution?

Using data from the Research on Employment in Metropolitan areas, routinely collected by the Census Bureau (IBGE) the authors identify that unemployment jumped from 5% in 1992 to 8% in 1998 in the metropolitan areas, that informal work (without contract and as such without access to social benefits) grew, so much so, that there are more self-employed people than people working with a contract. Productivity grew by 6,75% between 1990 and 1993 and another 7,65% between 1994 and 1997. Did any of this growth in productivity translate into gains for workers? No, wage inequality was unchanged, labour laws were "made more flexible", so people could be hired for fixed period, also the dismissal of personnel was made easier. If the majority did not profit from this process who did? According with Maia and Arbache (2002) who analysed the labour market, it was the highly skilled worker the group that most benefits achieved from trade liberalization, since much of the improvement in productivity was the result of the adoption of technological innovations that needed skilled people to be implemented.

Soares, Servo and Arbache (2001) show that at present the job market offers less jobs than the market demands. This is not caused so much by import but by improved productivity. Most jobs were lost as result of improvement in productivity. Part of this improvement was direct result of trade liberalization that in turn made new equipment and new technologies more accessible to manufacturers. In the authors' assessment 3,8 million jobs were not created in Brazil as result of improved productivity- this represents 7,1% of the average job stock.

Job loss was not homogeneous. Some sectors of the industry were more affected. The automobile industry for instance lost 28% of the jobs, 25% of which due to imports. Importation of cars is much reduced now by the fact that a number of new industries built plants in Brazil but the plants are now highly automated, production is widely fragmented with multiple subcontractors, it is in sum no longer a labour intensive industry but one that requires more and more skilled workers. It does not even require a broad system of suppliers in the vicinity which results in more flexibility for plant location: this encouraged "wars" between states that were competing for new automobile plants: from donating land to local tax exemptions for a number years were some of the tools used in this war. São Paulo, once the capital of automobile manufacturing in Brazil has almost lost this status: many manufacturers that had a long history in the region opted for other states to build new plants, not only because of the attractions posed by other states but also to flee local trade unions. Steel workers²⁷, in São Paulo, are seen to be too organized, too aware of their rights and too eager to demand improvements. New places could prove to provide a more docile work force.

If jobs were lost due to increase in productivity, and if part of the economic restructuring involved changes in labour legislation, what are the results for the structure of the labour market? Cardoso (2001) analysed what happened to labour legislation and to labour in general, as result of the economic policies

²⁷ After all they did form a political party- The Workers Party, not a small achievement as is the main opposition party in the country and possibly the source of the new President of the country.

adopted in 20 years:1980-2000, examining the following hypothesis: The more precarious the mechanisms of social protection the greater the impact of incorporating new technologies. For the case of Brazil Cardoso proved that this hypothesis was true. As result of the incorporation of new technologies the Brazilian labour market presented at the turn of the 21st century the following characteristics:

- the trade and services sector represent a greater share than it did at the beginning of the 1990's ,
- high rate of informal work,
- high unemployment,
- high rates of precarious work,
- relative stagnation of average income,
- relative stagnation of income distribution.

The growth of the informal sector cannot be underestimated, in 7 years (between 1991 and 1998) work without contract and self-employed came to represent 48% of the work force in the metropolitan areas. By 1999 half of the work force in metropolitan areas were either working without a contract or were self-employed, and by the year 2000 the percentage reached 51%. The manufacturing sector shrank from providing about 22% of the work places and from having 84% of its workforce working under legal contract (1991) to 16% of the work places with of 70% of workers under formal contract by 1999. The trend to informality was beginning to contaminate the industry as well. The services sector, generally less compliant with the labour legislation, though responsible for 36% of the job posts (1991), in 1999 had increased this share to 42% the majority of which (60%) were informal (Ramos, 2001).

Job informality has many costs, as seen previously, but in the case of Brazil due to the high income inequality the costs are higher than elsewhere. The Secretary of Social Welfare²⁸, early in 2002 estimated that due to informal work contracts 40,2 million workers in Brazil did not contribute to the national pension/health scheme (Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social- INSS). This represented 1,1% of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and it translated into a US \$ 3.6 billion dollars deficit for the system. The estimations were that should all workers contribute to the system, the INSS would have a surplus of US\$ 1 billion dollars. It was also estimated, early in 2002, that 42% of the adult working population had no retirement plan whatsoever as result of job informality. Growing numbers of workers are not contributing for either health or retirement plans. Anyone can contribute as an autonomous (self-employed) worker, there are no legal obstacles to this, the obstacles are in the income that workers are getting from the informal sector: it is not enough for them to contribute for their future well being. This is a bill that the whole of the society eventually will have to pay. This leads us to explore what has happened to wages as result of trade liberalization. Previously we saw that improvements in productivity did not result in better wages, but what has happened to society as a whole?

Trade liberalization and income inequality

According with various authors (Green, Dickerson and Arbache, 2001; Paes de Barros, Henriques and Mendonça, 2001; Ramos and Vieira ,2001; Lisboa, 2002) nothing has changed in terms of wage improvements in the last 20 years. Inequality has been maintained, and at times the concentration of wealth has worsened. In 1999 it was clear that on average, during the past 20 years, 14% of the population (approximately 22 million people) have lived in destitution while another 34% of the population (or 53 million people) lived under the poverty line. (Paes de Barros, Henriques & Mendonça, 2001). If we add the number of people in destitution to those under the poverty line we find that 40 to 45% of the country's population to be very poor.

Brazil's per capita income is substantially higher than that of poor countries: US\$6,500. Barros et al (2001) having analysed the Human Development Report (UNDP) data concluded that countries with this per capita income tend to have a maximum of 10% of the population below the poverty line. Thus Brazil's level of poverty is absurdly high and in their view this is the result of a concentration of income at the top of the pyramid, expressed in the stability of the Gini coefficient in the period of over 20 years (1977 and 1999)

²⁸ Vinicius Carvalho Pinheiro interview in the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo March 9th, 2002 " O preço da informalidade".

when the coefficient went from 0,62 in 1977 to 0,60 in 1999. Such level of inequality places Brazil as one of the five most unequal countries in the world in the fourth position immediately after Guatemala, South Africa and Malawi. The 1% wealthiest group in Brazil has 13% of the total income, while the 50% poorest have 10% of the total income. It was so in 1977 and it remained so in 1999.

Green, Dickerson and Arbache (2001) analysed the effect of trade liberalization on income inequality comparing wages and labour before and after trade liberalization and concluded: *“wages rise with education, but it is notable that for every group the mean wage has declined during 1981-1999. The wage decline was least for illiterate workers, and greatest for those with intermediate levels of completed schooling. In the period since 1992, both very low and very high educated groups improved their wages relative to those at intermediate levels. Thus the stable average wage for the whole workforce over time reflects the combination of rising shares in the upper education groups and falling wages for every.”* This led the authors to conclude that *“the significant and substantial rise in returns to college education...are by no means important enough to affect overall wage inequality ...college educated workers remain quite a small proportion of the workforce.”* Other authors have arrived at similar conclusions (Rocha, 2000): absolute poverty remains at present at the same level as before trade liberalization, the same is true for inequality.

If the labour market did not generate more jobs as result of trade liberalization (and all the measures to stabilize the economy) and if income inequality was not reduced by globalisation, what has happened to work for youth, our most vulnerable group, the one that is most likely to be a victim or a victimizer in urban violence? Camarano (2002) and Quadros (2001) have concluded that economic restructuring has not benefited youth work: in fact the entry level jobs available to youth today are much worse today than they were in 1980. While the population grew by 8,8% between 1992 and 1998, jobs grew by 7,2% (Quadros, 2001). In this period long term unemployment grew 83,1%, so it is not a surprise that most of the unemployed will be youth: 21% between 20 and 24 years and 27% between 15 and 19 years.

Youth unemployment is a urban phenomena and if we consider only urban areas youth unemployment will be much higher. Camarano compared the labour market in 1980 and in 1999 and concluded that: today initial pay is lower; getting the first job is much more difficult; (despite the fact that today's youth have a much higher educational achievement); work contracts are more precarious either for a fixed term or informal; and as result that most youth entering the market have no access to pension fund, health scheme, or to unemployment benefit.

The data presented so far refers to the country. Urban centres such as São Paulo are expected to differ from this picture, in particular when they used to be in forefront of the economy of the country. São Paulo, that for decades concentrated most of the industrial activity of the country: in 1970 the city was responsible for 42,2% of the national industrial production but by 2000 this percentage had dropped to 13,9%. The city still plays a major role in the country's economy, but this increasingly involves other sectors of the economy: services, finance, trade, telecommunications and so forth. Industries have moved out to other cities in the state and outside the state pressured by high city taxes, by high rental costs or by high land values and by other aspects such as the poor quality of life and the violence. Labour intensive industries have moved to areas of the country where labour is cheaper: shoe making, textiles, and clothing went to the Northeast of Brazil and some steel and metal moved to areas closer to ore mines. (IBGE, 2002)

If industries left, it is expected that much low entry level jobs have gone as well. This would make youth's entry in the job market more difficult in general and that of poor youth even more difficult. Unemployment in São Paulo has been running persistently high for the past 3 years around 20,4%²⁹ of the economically active population (DIEESE-SEADE). For youth this rate is estimated to twice as high.

Also if we consider the literature on structure of the labour market, nature of the contracts and role that inequality plays in violence, and more what is expected to happen when educational achievement improves but this is not matched by improvements in the labour market, as well as the role that concentrated poverty or worse that the presence of large groups of unemployed adults in the community is not a neutral factor, the growing presence of violence and fear in São Paulo are to be expected. Though youth and their

²⁹ This includes open and covert unemployment - people who have precarious work but who are searching for formal work.

families are investing in education, despite the many difficulties but the rewards are coming. The last decades have given no reason for youth to believe in social mobility. The maintenance of the extremely high levels of inequality is charging unbearable toll. People living with an income of up to 2 minimum wages (US\$160,00) were found in a study by researchers (Silveira et al, 2002) from the National Institute of Planning and Applied Economics –(IPEA) to suffer from insufficient caloric intake in all metropolitan areas of Brazil (except for Curitiba in the South). Surprisingly this insufficiency was greater in São Paulo than in poorer cities of the Northeast of Brazil. The situation in São Paulo closely resembles that of endemic hunger. The authors that hunger is not endemic yet because employers in the region, tend to comply more with the labour legislation and to provide food tickets for their workers people to buy meals and a food basket monthly. This is true of employers who have workers under a formal contract, a condition we know to be rarer and rarer.

Concluding remarks

São Paulo has many traits of a global city and presents high rates of criminal violence. The two do phenomena do not seem to bear a causal relation. Violence was growing before the economy was made more open to external markets and even during high economic growth periods. The continued growth of violence seems to be more related to the deeply ingrained inequalities in the access to rights than to a certain model of economic relations. Inequalities so deep that the improvements that took place in the last ten years do not seem to reach the most needy ones. The data presented here repeatedly pointed to the imperviousness of this inequality: some groups seem to be excluded and so excluded that only doses of benefits that reach other areas of the city arrive, improvements are trickling down when they should be arriving massively. But if globalisation cannot be blamed it cannot be totally exculpated either. The models of production, the emphasis on competitiveness and in high profit margins, in short periods of time, that seem to guide international capital at present, show no commiseration with the ones that cannot keep pace with the expectations of profit in the central economies. International capital, and its fluctuations in assigning who is the champion and who is the loser at a moment in time, gains an image of lacking in commitment with the culture and societies to which is directed, and in this sense the notion of globalisation as something positive, as more than colonialism with a new face (and without its share of responsibility for the natives), is threatened. If capital is to be so volatile as to flee at the first sign of reduced profits, where does the notion of interrelations of mutual gains, of shared interests go?

Globalisation cannot be indicted as the main culprit, nor can it be exculpated entirely. Many of the promises were not fulfilled. The country has had to submit and the city as well to harsh economic policies in order to be attractive to foreign investments. Investments, even in large plants can be very temporary, contrary to what used to be in the past. A new plant can be build for just a couple of years. As result of the fluctuations in the degree of attractiveness that the country and the city can offer to investors more sacrifices are called for and still jobs did not become abundant, economic growth did not take place as expected, and needed, the labour market became more mean, indifferent, lacking in compassion.

The reduction of the inequalities, that lie at the root of the deprivations, demand action from public authorities, the same authorities that allowed for the inequalities to prosper. We seem entangled in a vicious cycle: deprivation breeding violence that breeds mistrust and (often authoritarian attitudes) competition. The major challenge for our society is to break this cycle. The World Bank documents, reviewed here, prescribe economic growth as the option. When we see the level of unemployment, and the costs that unemployment and poverty are incurring on people's lives, and on society as a whole, we are forced to agree. But the cycle that started long before economic restructuring, or trade liberalization or yet the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies started does not seem so easy to break. The IMF tells us that to grow we must maintain inflation rates low and keep a balanced budget, which translates into higher interest rates and more government cuts. Government cuts or restriction in government expending are already responsible for the poorly equipped schools, for the lack of youth training schemes, for the lack of housing alternatives for the poor, for lack of hospitals, infrastructure etc.

The fact is that in the meantime life has become harder, more competitive, and more stressful. Worse still is that people, in their struggle to survive, convey to youth a certain sense of despair, non conducive to dreaming about the future. This perhaps is one of the greatest losses and one that may be feeding more violence, because when youth may not see a way out or because they have nothing to lose. The dream of

economic democracy, in which a full fledged entry in the free market economy, where any one who had the will and the capacity to persevere, is not producing the happiness that was expected. When the Military Regime ended and democracy started this was the hope: now we will start again, more knowledgeable because we learned from their mistakes, freer because now their would be no longer impromptu economic packages that would fall on us and cause havoc from day to life and that reduced our lives to coping with perennial uncertainty. Now the rules would be established after broad consultation and the will and needs of the people would prevail and we would be able to plan and carry out plans. After 17 years of political and economic democracy we are still struggling with past debts and with present uncertainties.

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